Why the TPP Cannot Cooperate with the DPP
By Wu Tien-jung, the Storm Media Opinion, November 20, 2025
Since the split between the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) publicly erupted in December 2023 to gestures of goodwill between KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun and TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang, some have viewed cooperation between the two parties as a tortuous but inevitable path. However, Taiwan’s politics remain in a developing stage, and no progress is historically predetermined. Whether the KMT and TPP will truly cooperate remains highly uncertain. If the two parties eventually do collaborate, it would largely be the result of a series of missteps by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and President Lai Ching-te’s administration.
To pave the way for cooperation, the TPP has recently pushed a series of academic and practical seminars on the “coalition government” concept. This, however, triggered unwarranted ridicule and attacks from the DPP, which stated that “Taiwan is not a parliamentary system country.” The DPP further argued that only parliamentary systems require a majority-stable cabinet and thus inter-party cooperation and alliances. Even this brief press release exposed the DPP’s mindset of preferring a minority government while monopolizing power—a mentality that fully explains the political disorder of the past two years.
It can be argued that a stable legislative majority is a prerequisite for parliamentary governance. Presidential and semi-presidential systems can survive without such a majority, but may operate in a crippled, obstructed fashion—precisely the current situation of the Lai administration. The DPP revealed its true colors in the statement, “only in a majority-stable cabinet is inter-party cooperation needed,” shocking observers with how little the ruling party values cross-party collaboration.
Given the current partisan confrontations, what the KMT gains is the DPP’s loss, largely due to the absence of TPP cooperation. In fact, the TPP should be the DPP’s most suitable partner. First, the TPP’s eight legislative seats are an ideal scale to supplement a minority DPP administration. Second, to quote former TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je, the TPP has a different DNA from the KMT, but Mr. Ko has never described the TPP’s relationship with the DPP in the same way. The TPP is more flexible on independence-unification issues while remaining largely pro-Taiwan; on social policies, it leans toward the centrist-left progressive values historically associated with the DPP.
Given this affinity, why has the DPP not sought TPP cooperation when it failed to achieve a legislative majority? In hindsight, apart from temporary efforts by Premier Cho Jung-tai and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-long, most DPP leaders ultimately adhered to the rigid strategy of party whip Legislator Ker Chien-ming, preventing the TPP from gaining influence. The so-called “useless eight seats” is an understatement. Beyond the legislature, the TPP faces smear campaigns from pro-DPP media and exhaustive investigations by prosecutors. The DPP has not only refused to cooperate with the TPP but actively suppressed and attempted to eliminate it. The ruling party’s leadership strategy remains unclear, but it clearly aims to prevent competitors from growing—particularly concerned about the TPP siphoning younger voters. In practice, the DPP’s approach is not far from the authoritarian-era “no stream may run freely,” leaving no space for inter-party collaboration.
Another, even more crucial reason lies in policy alignment. As previously noted, party cooperation or coalition government inherently involves both power and policy. Even if the DPP were willing to cede positions of power, consensus with the TPP would be difficult on policy matters. For example, Chairman Huang has criticized the DPP for advocating expanded referendum and voting rights while in opposition, yet in recent years, when reforms that would facilitate youth voting—such as domestic ballot transfers—were proposed, the DPP opposed them citing “national security concerns” and even stigmatized such policies as “Chinese interference,” betraying its earlier democratic commitments. Likewise, the DPP, which rose to prominence through referendum support, opposes linking referenda to major elections, limiting their timeliness and reach, contradicting its original ideals of direct democracy. These cases illustrate how the DPP often abandons democratic principles when they conflict with maintaining power.
Taiwan is not without examples of party cooperation; the alliance between the KMT and People First Party (PFP) was possible because of shared origins, with leaders divided but voters largely unified. By contrast, the KMT and TPP are heterogeneous from leadership to grassroots. Achieving a parliamentary-style cooperation ideal in a non-parliamentary system—finding common ground amid differences to deepen democracy—represents an important democratic experiment.